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MONETARY POLICY AND THE
ECONOMIC OUTLOOK
Last year was a difﬁcult one for the economy of the
United States. The slowdown in the growth of
economic activity that had become apparent in late
2000 intensiﬁed in the ﬁrst half of the year. Busi-
nesses slashed investment spending—making espe-
cially deep cuts in outlays for high-technology
equipment—in response to weakening ﬁnal demand,
an oversupply of some types of capital, and declining
proﬁts. As actual and prospective sales deteriorated,
many ﬁrms in the factory sector struggled with
uncomfortably high levels of inventories, and the
accompanying declines in manufacturing output
steepened. At the same time, foreign economies also
slowed, further reducing the demand for U.S. produc-
tion. The aggressive actions by the Federal Reserve
to ease the stance of monetary policy in the ﬁrst half
of the year provided support to consumer spending
and the housing sector. Nevertheless, the weakening
in activity became more widespread through the
summer, job losses mounted further, and the unem-
ployment rate moved higher. With few indications
that economic conditions were about to improve,
with underlying inﬂation moderate and edging lower,
and with inﬂation expectations well contained, the
Federal Reserve continued its efforts to counter the
ongoing weakness by cutting the federal funds rate,
bringing the cumulative reduction in that rate to
3 percentage points by August.
The devastating events of September 11 further set
back an already fragile economy. Heightened uncer-
tainty and badly shaken conﬁdence caused a wide-
spread pullback from economic activity and from
risk-taking in ﬁnancial markets, where equity prices
fell sharply for several weeks and credit risk spreads
widened appreciably. The most pressing concern of
the Federal Reserve in the ﬁrst few days following
the attacks was to help shore up the infrastructure of
ﬁnancial markets and to provide massive quantities
of liquidity to limit potential disruptions to the func-
tioning of those markets. The economic fallout of the
events of September 11 led the Federal Open Market
Committee (FOMC) to cut the target federal funds
rate after a conference call early the following week
and again at each meeting through the end of the year
(see box ‘‘Monetary Policy after the Terrorist
Attacks’’).
Displaying the same swift response to economic
developments that appears to have characterized
much business behavior in the current cyclical epi-
sode, ﬁrms moved quickly to reduce payrolls and
cut production after mid-September. Although these
adjustments occurred across a broad swath of the
economy, manufacturing and industries related to
travel, hospitality, and entertainment bore the brunt
of the downturn. Measures of consumer conﬁdence
fell sharply in the ﬁrst few weeks after the attacks,
but the deterioration was not especially large by
cyclical standards, and improvement in some of these
indexes was evident in October. Similarly, equity
prices started to rebound in late September, and risk
spreads began to narrow somewhat by early Novem-
ber, when it became apparent that the economic
effects of the attacks were proving less severe than
many had feared.
Consumer spending remained surprisingly solid
over the ﬁnal three months of the year in the face of
enormous economic uncertainty, widespread job
losses, and further deterioration of household balance
sheets from the sharp drop in equity prices immedi-
ately following September 11. Several factors were at
work in support of household spending during this
period. Low and declining interest rates provided a
lift to outlays for durable goods and to activity in
housing markets. Nowhere was the boost from low
interest rates more apparent than in the sales of new
motor vehicles, which soared in response to the
ﬁnancing incentives offered by manufacturers. Low
mortgage interest rates not only sustained high levels
of new home construction but also allowed house-
holds to reﬁnance mortgages and extract equity from
homes to pay down other debts or to increase spend-
ing. Fiscal policy provided additional support to con-
sumer spending. The cuts in taxes enacted last year,
including the rebates paid out over the summer, cush-
ioned the loss of income from the deterioration in
labor markets. And the purchasing power of house-hold income was further enhanced by the sharp drop
in energy prices during the autumn. With businesses
having positioned themselves to absorb a falloff of
demand, the surprising strength in household spend-
ing late in the year resulted in a dramatic liquidation
of inventories. In the end, real gross domestic product
posted a much better performance than had been
anticipated in the immediate aftermath of the attacks.
More recently, there have been encouraging signs
that economic activity is beginning to ﬁrm. Job losses
diminished considerably in December and January,
and initial claims for unemployment insurance and
Monetary Policy after the Terrorist Attacks
The terrorist attacks on September 11 destroyed a portion of
the infrastructure of U.S. ﬁnancial markets, disrupted com-
munication networks, and forced some market participants
to retreat to contingency sites in varying states of readi-
ness. These developments, along with the tragic loss of
life among the employees of a few major ﬁnancial ﬁrms,
greatly complicated trading, clearing, and settlement of
many different classes of ﬁnancial instruments. Direct dis-
locations elevated uncertainties about payment ﬂows, mak-
ing it difﬁcult for the reserve market to channel funds where
they were needed most. Depositories that held more reserve
balances than they preferred had considerable difﬁculty
unloading the excess in the market; by contrast, deposi-
tories awaiting funds had to scramble to cover overdraft
positions. As a result, the effective demand for reserves
ballooned.
The Federal Reserve accommodated the increase in the
demand for reserves through a variety of means, the relative
importance of which shifted through the week. On Tuesday
morning, shortly after the attacks, the Federal Reserve
issued a press release reassuring ﬁnancial markets that the
Federal Reserve System was functioning normally and stat-
ing that ‘‘the discount window is available to meet liquidity
needs.’’ Depository institutions took up the offer, and bor-
rowing surged to a record $451⁄2 billion by Wednesday.
Discount loans outstanding dropped off sharply on Thurs-
day and returned to very low levels by Friday. Separately,
overnight overdrafts on Tuesday and Wednesday rose to
several billion dollars, as a handful of depository and other
institutions with accounts at the Federal Reserve were
forced into overdraft on their reserve accounts. Overnight
overdrafts returned to negligible levels by the end of the
week.
Like their U.S. counterparts, foreign ﬁnancial institutions
operating in the United States faced elevated dollar liquidity
needs. In some cases, however, these institutions encoun-
tered difﬁculties positioning the collateral at their U.S.
branches to secure Federal Reserve discount window credit.
To be in a position to help meet those needs, three foreign
central banks established new or expanded arrangements
with the Federal Reserve to receive dollars in exchange for
their respective currencies. These swap lines, which lasted
for thirty days, consisted of $50 billion for the European
Central Bank, $30 billion for the Bank of England, and an
increase of $8 billion (from $2 billion to $10 billion) for the
Bank of Canada. The European Central Bank drew on its
line that week to channel the funds to institutions with a
need for dollars.
By Thursday and Friday, the disruption in air trafﬁc
caused the Federal Reserve to extend record levels of credit
to depository institutions in the form of check ﬂoat. Float
increased dramatically because the Federal Reserve contin-
ued to credit the accounts of banks for deposited checks
even though the grounding of airplanes meant that checks
normally shipped by air could not be presented to the
checkwriters’ banks on the usual schedule. Float declined to
normal levels the following week once air trafﬁc was per-
mitted to recommence. Lastly, over the course of the week
that included September 11, as the market for reserves
began to function more normally, the Federal Reserve
resumed the use of open market operations to provide the
bulk of reserves. The open market Desk accommodated all
propositions down to the target federal funds rate, operating
exclusively through overnight transactions for several days.
The injection of reserves through open market operations
peaked at $81 billion on Friday. The combined infusion of
liquidity from the various sources pushed the level of
reserve balances at Federal Reserve Banks to more than
$100 billion on Wednesday, September 12, about ten times
the normal level. As anticipated by the FOMC, federal
funds traded somewhat below their new target level for
the rest of the week. By the end of the month, bid–asked
spreads and trading volumes in the interbank and other
markets receded to more normal levels, and federal funds
consistently began to trade around the intended rate.
The Federal Reserve took several steps to facilitate mar-
ket functioning in September in addition to accommodating
the heightened demand for reserves. The hours of funds and
securities transfer systems operated by the Federal Reserve
were extended signiﬁcantly for a week after the attacks. The
Federal Reserve Bank of New York liberalized the terms
under which it would lend the securities in the System
portfolio, and the amount of securities lent rose to record
levels in the second half of September. For the ten days
following the attacks, the Federal Reserve reduced or elimi-
nated the penalty charged on overnight overdrafts, largely
because those overdrafts were almost entirely the result
of extraordinary developments beyond the control of the
account holders. In addition, the Federal Reserve helped
restore communication between market participants and in
some cases processed bilateral loans of reserves between
account holders in lieu of market intermediation.
142 Federal Reserve Bulletin March 2002the level of insured unemployment have reversed
their earlier sharp increases. Although motor vehicle
purchases have declined appreciably from their blis-
tering fourth-quarter pace, early readings suggest that
consumer spending overall has remained very strong
early this year. In the business sector, new orders for
capital equipment have provided some tentative indi-
cations that the deep retrenchment in investment
spending could be abating. Meanwhile, purchasing
managers in the manufacturing sector report that
orders have strengthened and that they view the level
of their customers’ inventories as being in better
balance. Indeed, the increasingly rapid pace of inven-
tory runoff over the course of the last year has left the
level of production well below that of sales, suggest-
ing scope for a recovery in output given the current
sales pace. Against this backdrop, the FOMC left its
target for the federal funds rate unchanged in Janu-
ary. However, reﬂecting a concern that growth could
be weaker than the economy’s potential for a time,
the FOMC retained its assessment that the risks were
tilted unacceptably toward economic weakness.
The extent and persistence of any recovery in
production will, of course, depend critically on the
trajectory of ﬁnal demand in the period ahead. Sev-
eral factors are providing impetus to such a recovery
in the coming year. With the real federal funds rate
hovering around zero, monetary policy should be
positioned to support growth in spending. Money and
credit expanded fairly rapidly through the end of the
year, and many households and businesses have
strengthened their ﬁnances by locking in relatively
low-cost long-term credit. The second installment of
personal income tax cuts and scheduled increases in
government spending on homeland security and
national defense also will provide some stimulus to
activity this year. Perhaps the most signiﬁcant poten-
tial support to the economy could come from further
gains in private-sector productivity. Despite the pro-
nounced slowdown in real GDP growth last year,
output per hour in the nonfarm business sector
increased impressively. Continued robust gains in
productivity, stemming from likely advances in tech-
nology, should provide a considerable boost to house-
hold and business incomes and spending and contrib-
ute to a sustained, noninﬂationary recovery.
Still, the economy faces considerable risk of sub-
par economic performance in the period ahead.
Because outlays for durable goods and for new homes
have been relatively well maintained in this cycle, the
scope for strong upward impetus from household
spending seems more limited than has often been the
case in past recoveries. Moreover, the net decline in
household net worth relative to income over the past
two years is likely to continue to restrain the growth
of spending in coming quarters. To be sure, the con-
traction in business capital spending appears to be
waning. But spending on some types of equipment,
most notably communications equipment, continues
to decline, and there are few signs yet of a broad-
based upturn in capital outlays. Activity abroad
remains subdued, and a rebound of foreign output is
likely to follow, not lead, a rebound in the United
States. Furthermore, lenders and equity investors
remain quite cautious. Banks have continued to
tighten terms and standards on loans, and risk spreads
have increased a little this year. Stock prices have
retreated from recent highs as earnings continue to
fall amid concerns about the transparency of corpo-
rate ﬁnancial reports and uncertainty about the pace
at which proﬁtability will improve.
Monetary Policy, Financial Markets, and
the Economy over 2001 and Early 2002
As economic weakness spread and intensiﬁed over
the ﬁrst half of 2001, the FOMC aggressively low-
ered its target for the federal funds rate. Because
ﬁrms reacted unusually swiftly to indicators that
inventories were uncomfortably high and capital was
becoming underutilized, the drop in production and
business capital spending was especially steep. More-
over, sharp downward revisions in corporate proﬁt
expectations caused equity prices to plunge, which,
along with a decline in consumer conﬁdence, pointed
to vulnerability in household spending. Meanwhile, a
signiﬁcant deceleration in energy prices, after a surge
early in the year, began to hold down overall inﬂa-
tion; the restraining effect of energy prices, combined
with the moderation of resource utilization, also
promised to reduce core inﬂation. Responding to the
rapid deterioration in economic conditions, the
FOMC cut its target for the federal funds rate 21⁄2 per-
centage points—in 5 half-point steps—by the middle
of May. Moreover, the FOMC indicated throughout
this period that it judged the balance of risks to the
outlook as weighted toward economic weakness. The
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
approved reductions in the discount rate that matched
the Committee’s cuts in the target federal funds rate.
As a result, the discount rate declined from 6 percent
to 31⁄2 percent over the period.
At its June and August meetings, the FOMC noted
information suggesting continued softening in the
economy and a lack of convincing evidence that the
end of the slide in activity was in sight. Although
consumer spending on both housing and nonhousing
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gage interest rates, declining energy prices, and real-
ized capital gains from home sales—remained fairly
resilient, economic conditions in manufacturing dete-
riorated further. Firms continued to reduce payrolls,
work off excess inventories, and cut back capital
equipment expenditures amid sluggish growth in
business sales, signiﬁcantly lower corporate proﬁts,
and greater uncertainty about future sales and earn-
ings. With energy prices in retreat, price inﬂation
remained subdued. In reaching its policy decisions at
its June and August meetings, the FOMC took into
account the substantial monetary policy stimulus
already implemented since the start of the year—but
not yet fully absorbed by the economy—and the
oncoming effects of stimulative ﬁscal policy mea-
sures recently enacted by the Congress. Conse-
quently, the Committee opted for smaller interest rate
cuts of 1⁄4 percentage point at both the June and
August meetings, which brought the target federal
funds rate down to 31⁄2 percent; as earlier in the year,
the FOMC continued to indicate that it judged the
balance of risks to the outlook as weighted toward
economic weakness. After both meetings, the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System also
approved similar reductions in the discount rate,
which moved down to 3 percent.
After the terrorist attacks on September 11, the
available Committee members held a telephone con-
ference on September 13, during which they agreed
that the ﬁnancial markets were too disrupted to allow
for an immediate alteration in the stance of monetary
policy. However, the members were in agreement
that the attacks’ potential effects on asset prices and
on the performance of the economy, and the resulting
uncertainty, would likely warrant some policy easing
in the very near future. Accordingly, the FOMC, at a
telephone conference on September 17, voted to
reduce its target for the federal funds rate 1⁄2 percent-
age point, to 3 percent, and stated that it continued to
judge the risks to the outlook to be weighted toward
economic weakness.
Over subsequent weeks, heightened aversion to
risk, which caused investors to ﬂock from private to
Treasury and federal agency debt, boosted risk
spreads sharply, especially on lower-rated corporate
debt. Increased demand for safe and liquid assets
contributed to selling pressure in the stock market. At
its October 2 meeting, the FOMC had little hard
information available on economic developments
since the attacks. However, evidence gleaned from
surveys, anecdotes, and market contacts indicated
that the events of September 11 had considerable
adverse repercussions on an already weak economy:
Survey indicators of consumer conﬁdence had fallen,
and consumer spending had apparently declined. At
the same time, anecdotal information pointed to addi-
tional deep cutbacks in capital spending by many
ﬁrms after an already-signiﬁcant contraction in busi-
ness ﬁxed investment over the summer months.
When the FOMC met on November 6, scattered
early data tended to conﬁrm the information that the
decline in production, employment, and ﬁnal demand
had steepened after the terrorist attacks. Although an
economic turnaround beginning in the ﬁrst half of
2002 was a reasonable expectation according to the
Committee, concrete evidence that the economy was
stabilizing had yet to emerge. Meanwhile, the marked
decrease in energy prices since the spring had
induced a decline in overall price inﬂation, and inﬂa-
tion expectations had fallen. Accordingly, the FOMC
voted to lower its target for the federal funds rate
Selected interest rates
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144 Federal Reserve Bulletin March 20021⁄2 percentage point at both its October and Novem-
ber meetings and reiterated its view that the risks to
the outlook were weighted toward economic weak-
ness. The sizable adjustments in the stance of mone-
tary policy in part reﬂected concerns that insufﬁcient
policy stimulus posed an unacceptably high risk of a
more extended cyclical retrenchment that could prove
progressively more difﬁcult to counter, given that the
federal funds rate—at 2 percent—was already at such
a low level.
By the time of the December FOMC meeting, the
most recent data were suggesting that the rate of
economic decline might be moderating. After plung-
ing earlier in the year, orders and shipments of
nondefense capital goods had turned up early in the
fourth quarter, and the most recent survey evidence
for manufacturing also suggested that some expan-
sion in that sector’s activity might be in the ofﬁng.
In the household sector, personal consumption
expenditures appeared to have been quite well main-
tained, an outcome that reﬂected the continuation of
zero-rate ﬁnancing packages offered by the automak-
ers, widespread price discounting, and low interest
rates. In an environment of very low mortgage inter-
est rates, household demand for housing remained at
a relatively high level, and ﬁnancial resources freed
up by a rapid pace of mortgage reﬁnancing activity
also supported consumer spending.
Nonetheless, the evidence of emerging stabiliza-
tion in the economy was quite tentative and limited,
and the Committee saw subpar economic perfor-
mance as likely to persist over the near term. More-
over, in the probable absence of signiﬁcant inﬂation-
ary pressures for some time, a modest easing action
could be reversed in a timely manner if it turned out
not to be needed. In view of these considerations, the
FOMC lowered its target for the federal funds rate
1⁄4 percentage point, to 13⁄4 percent, on December 11,
2001, and stated that it continued to judge the risks to
the outlook to be weighted mainly toward economic
weakness. As had been the case throughout the year,
the Board of Governors approved reductions in the
discount rate that matched the FOMC’s cuts in the
target federal funds rate, bringing the discount rate to
11⁄4 percent, its lowest level since 1948.
Subsequent news on economic activity bolstered
the view that the economy was beginning to stabilize.
The information reviewed at the January 29–30,
2002, FOMC meeting indicated that consumer spend-
ing had held up remarkably well, investment orders
had ﬁrmed further, and the rate of decline in manufac-
turing production had lessened toward the end of
2001. With weakness in business activity abating,
and monetary policy already having been eased sub-
stantially, the FOMC left the federal funds rate
unchanged at the close of its meeting, but it contin-
ued to see the risks to the outlook as weighted mainly
toward economic weakness.
Economic Projections for 2002
Federal Reserve policymakers are expecting the
economy to begin to recover this year from the mild
downturn experienced in 2001, but the pace of expan-
sion is not projected to be sufﬁcient to cut into the
margin of underutilized resources. The central ten-
dency of the real GDP growth forecasts made by the
members of the Board of Governors and the Federal
Reserve Bank presidents is 21⁄2 percent to 3 percent,
measured as the change between the ﬁnal quarter of
2001 and the ﬁnal quarter of this year. The pace of
expansion is likely to increase only gradually over
the course of the year, and the unemployment rate is
expected to move higher for a time. The FOMC
members project the civilian unemployment rate to
stand at about 6 percent to 61⁄4 percent at the end of
2002.
A diminution of the rate of inventory liquidation
is likely to be an important factor helping to buoy
production this year. In 2001, businesses cut inven-
tories sharply so as to avoid carrying excessive stocks
relative to the weaker pace of sales, and although this
process of liquidation probably is not yet complete
in many industries, the overall pace of reduction is
likely to slow. Then, as ﬁnal demand strengthens,
liquidation should give way to some restocking later
in the year.
As noted above, the forces affecting demand this
year are mixed. On the positive side are the stimula-
tive effects of both ﬁscal policy and the earlier mone-
tary policy actions. A gradual turnaround in employ-
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Nominal GDP ................. 1.9 3 1⁄2–51⁄2 4–41⁄2
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1. Change from average for fourth quarter of previous year to average for
fourth quarter of year indicated.
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major trading partners should provide some lift to
ﬁnal demand, and spending by both households and
businesses ought to be supported by robust productiv-
ity growth. On the other hand, the problems facing
the high-tech sector have not yet completely receded,
and indications are that spending on other types of
capital equipment remains lackluster. The surprising
strength of household spending through this period of
economic weakness suggests a lack of pent-up con-
sumer demand going forward. In addition, consumers
likely will not beneﬁt from declining energy prices to
the extent they did last year, and the net decline in
equity values since mid-2000 will probably continue
to weigh on consumption spending in the period
ahead.
Federal Reserve policymakers believe that con-
sumer prices will increase slightly more rapidly in
2002 than in 2001, as last year’s sharp decline in
energy prices is unlikely to be repeated. The central
tendency of the FOMC members’ projections for
increases in the chain-type price index for personal
consumption expenditures (PCE) is about 11⁄2 per-
cent; last year’s actual increase was about 11⁄4 per-
cent. Nevertheless, diminished levels of resource
utilization, the indirect effects of previous declines in
energy prices on ﬁrms’ costs, and continued com-
petitive pressures all ought to restrain the pace of
price increases outside of the energy sector this year.
ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENTS
IN 2001 AND EARLY 2002
In 2001, the economy turned in its weakest perfor-
mance in a decade. Real GDP increased at an annual
rate of 3⁄4 percent in the ﬁrst half of the year and,
according to the advance estimate from the Com-
merce Department, declined at a 1⁄2 percent annual
rate in the second half. Although the effects of the
weakening economy were broadly felt, the factory
sector was especially hard hit. Faced with slumping
demand both here and abroad, manufacturers cut
production aggressively to limit excessive buildups
of inventories. Moreover, businesses sharply reduced
their investment spending, with particularly dramatic
cuts in outlays for high-technology equipment. By
contrast, household spending was reasonably well
maintained, buoyed by lower interest rates and cuts
in federal taxes. Firms trimmed payrolls through most
of the year, and the unemployment rate moved up
nearly 2 percentage points to around 53⁄4 percent by
year-end. Job losses were especially large following
the terrorist attacks of September 11, which had
extremely adverse effects on certain sectors of the
economy—most notably, airline transportation and
hospitality industries. Nevertheless, by early this year
some signs appeared that the economy was beginning
to mend.
Inﬂation declined last year, pulled down by a sharp
drop in energy prices. Excluding food and energy
items, consumer price inﬂation leveled off and, by
some measures, moved lower last year. Weakening
economic activity, the indirect effects of declining
energy prices on ﬁrms’ costs, and continued strong
competitive pressures helped keep a lid on core con-
sumer price inﬂation.
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Consumer Spending
Growth in consumer spending slowed last year but
remained sufﬁciently solid to provide an important
source of support to overall ﬁnal demand. Personal
consumption expenditures (PCE) increased 3 percent
in real terms in 2001 after having advanced 41⁄4 per-
cent in 2000 and around 5 percent in both 1998 and
1999. The deceleration in consumer spending was
widespread among durable goods, nondurable goods,
and services. However, motor vehicle expenditures
remained strong through most of the year and surged
in the fall as consumers responded enthusiastically
to automakers’ aggressive expansion of ﬁnancing
incentives. After September 11, spending declined in
certain travel- and tourism-related categories, includ-
ing air transportation, hotels and motels, and recre-
ation services such as amusement parks; spending in
these categories has recovered only partially since
then.
Last year’s downshift in consumption growth
reﬂected the weakening labor market and associated
deceleration of income as well as the erosion in
household wealth since the middle of 2000. With
employment declining over much of last year, real
personal income rose only about 13⁄4 percent after a
gain of 41⁄2 percent in 2000. The slowing of income
growth was even sharper in nominal terms, but price
declines for gasoline and other energy items in the
latter half of the year substantially cushioned the
blow to real incomes. A continued rise in house
prices supported the wealth position of many house-
holds; in the aggregate, however, household wealth
deteriorated further as equity prices moved lower, on
net. The decline in wealth since mid-2000 likely
exerted a notable restraining inﬂuence on household
spending last year.
Both monetary and ﬁscal policy supported con-
sumer spending over the past year. Low interest rates
helped enable motor vehicle ﬁnance companies to
offer favorable ﬁnancing on new vehicles. In addi-
tion, low mortgage rates led to a spate of mortgage
reﬁnancing that lasted most of the year, lowering
payments and freeing cash to be used by households
for other spending needs. Indeed, many households
apparently used these reﬁnancings as an opportunity
to extract equity from their homes, a move that
further accommodated consumer spending. Further-
more, the ﬁrst wave of tax reductions from the Eco-
nomic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of
2001—including the $300 and $600 rebate checks
mailed last summer—likely helped to boost spending
in the latter part of the year. The continued phase-in
of the tax reductions enacted last year should provide
further stimulus to income and consumption this year.
The personal saving rate, which had declined
through 1999, leveled off in 2000 and in the ﬁrst half
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Monetary Policy Report to the Congress 147of 2001. The saving rate moved erratically in the
second half of the year but rose on average. It shot up
in the summer as households received their tax
rebates; it then declined later in the year as house-
holds spent some of the rebates and as purchases
of new motor vehicles soared in response to the
incentives.
Consumer sentiment, as measured by both the Uni-
versity of Michigan Survey Research Center (SRC)
and the Conference Board, had been running at
extremely high levels through most of 2000 but fell
considerably near the beginning of last year as con-
cerns about the economy intensiﬁed. By the spring,
measures of sentiment leveled off near their historical
averages and well above levels normally associated
with recessions. Sentiment dropped in September.
The SRC measure recovered gradually thereafter,
while the Conference Board index fell further before
turning up later in the year; by early 2002, both
sentiment measures again stood near their historical
averages.
Residential Investment
As with consumer spending, real expenditures on
housing were well maintained last year, buoyed by
favorable mortgage interest rates. Interest rates on
thirty-year ﬁxed-rate mortgages, which had been as
high as 81⁄2 percent in the spring of 2000, hovered
around the low level of 7 percent in the ﬁrst half of
2001. They moved down further to 61⁄2 percent by
late October, before backing up to 7 percent again by
December as prospects for the economy improved.
As monetary policy eased, contract rates on
adjustable-rate mortgages moved down sharply to
very low levels in the fourth quarter and into early
2002. According to the Michigan SRC survey, declin-
ing mortgage rates have helped elevate consumers’
assessments of homebuying conditions substantially
since mid-2000.
In the single-family sector, 1.27 million new homes
were started last year, 31⁄2 percent more than in 2000,
when activity had been held down by higher mort-
gage rates. The pace of starts moved up further in
January 2002, in part because of unusually favorable
weather. Furthermore, sizable backlogs of building
permits early this year suggest that construction activ-
ity will remain solid. Sales of new homes were
elevated throughout 2001—indeed, for the year, they
were the highest on record—and sales of existing
homes remained strong as well. Meanwhile, the
increase in home prices moderated last year. The
constant-quality price index of new homes, which
attempts to control for the mix of homes sold, rose
only 11⁄2 percent last year, down from a 6 percent
gain in 2000.
In the multifamily sector, starts averaged 328,000
units last year, a rate close to the solid pace of the
past several years. Conditions are still relatively
favorable for the construction of multifamily units. In
particular, vacancy rates have remained low, although
rents and property values increased at a slower rate
last year than in 2000.
Household Finance
Households continued to borrow at a brisk pace last
year, increasing their debt outstanding an estimated
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The cumulative declines in mortgage interest rates
encouraged households to take on large amounts of
mortgage debt, both by fostering homebuying and by
making it attractive to reﬁnance existing mortgages
and extract some of the accumulated equity; indeed,
the Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA) reﬁnanc-
ing index in October reached the highest level since
its inception in January 1980. The frenzied pace of
reﬁnancing activity tailed off some later in the fourth
quarter, when ﬁxed mortgage interest rates backed
up. All told, mortgage debt grew an estimated 9 per-
cent last year. Strength in durable goods outlays
supported growth in consumer credit (debt not
secured by real estate) in the ﬁrst quarter of 2001, but
as consumption spending decelerated over the next
two quarters, the expansion of consumer credit
slowed sharply. However, consumer credit growth
surged in the fourth quarter, in large part because of
the jump in motor vehicle sales. For the year as a
whole, the rate of expansion of consumer credit, at
61⁄4 percent, was well below the 101⁄4 percent rate
posted in 2000.
Hefty household borrowing outstripped the growth
of disposable personal income in 2001. As a result,
despite lower interest rates, the household debt-
service burden—an estimate of minimum scheduled
payments on mortgage and consumer debt as a share
of disposable income—ﬁnished the year near the
peak recorded at the end of 1986. Measures of house-
hold credit quality deteriorated noticeably last year.
According to the MBA, delinquency rates on home
mortgages continued to trend higher from their his-
toric lows of the late 1990s, and auto loan delinquen-
cies at ﬁnance companies edged up, although they
too remained at a relatively subdued level. The eco-
nomic slowdown and the rise in unemployment sig-
niﬁcantly eroded the quality of loans to subprime
borrowers, and delinquency rates for both mortgages
and consumer credit in that segment of the market
moved sharply higher.
The Business Sector
Much of the weakness in activity last year was con-
centrated in the business sector. In late 2000, manu-
facturers had begun to cut back production in an
effort to reduce an undesired build-up of inventories,
and sharp inventory liquidation continued throughout
last year. Moreover, the boom in capital outlays that
had helped drive the expansion through the late 1990s
gave way to a softening of spending in late 2000 and
to sharp declines last year. Spending dropped for
most types of capital equipment and structures; cut-
backs were especially severe for high-tech equip-
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Monetary Policy Report to the Congress 149ment, some types of which may have been over-
bought. A sharp reduction in corporate proﬁts and
cash ﬂow contributed to last year’s downturn in capi-
tal spending, as did general uncertainty about the
economic outlook. Despite the reduction in interest
rates, which helped restrain businesses’ interest
expenses, ﬁnancing conditions worsened somewhat,
on balance, given weaker equity values, higher bor-
rowing costs for risky ﬁrms, and some tightening of
banks’ lending standards.
Fixed Investment
Real spending on equipment and software (E&S)
declined 81⁄2 percent in 2001 after an increase of the
same amount in 2000 and double-digit rates of
increase for several preceding years. Spending on
high-tech equipment, which has accounted for about
40 percent of E&S spending in recent years, dropped
especially sharply last year. Outlays for computers
and peripheral equipment, which had risen more than
30 percent in each of the preceding seven years, fell
9 percent in 2001. Spending on communications
equipment swung even more severely, moving from
increases of more than 20 percent on average from
1998 to 2000 to a decline of more than 30 percent last
year. Business spending on software held up com-
paratively well, falling only 21⁄2 percent in 2001 after
having risen around 12 percent in 1999 and 2000.
A number of factors may have weighed on outlays
for high-tech equipment, including businesses’ deci-
sions to lengthen the replacement cycle for comput-
ers in light of weak economic conditions and the
absence of new applications requiring the most up-to-
date machines. But in addition, the magnitude by
which these categories of expenditure had increased
in preceding years, together with the abruptness of
their downturn, suggests that ﬁrms may have been
too optimistic about the immediate proﬁtability of
some types of high-tech capital; as these expectations
were revised, businesses viewed their previous
investment as more than sufﬁcient to meet anticipated
demand. This possibility is especially likely in the
case of communications equipment, for which expec-
tations about prospects for growth in demand appear
to have been disappointed. Some of the cutbacks may
have reﬂected a general pulling back in an environ-
ment of greater uncertainty. The sharp rise and subse-
quent decline of equity values in the high-tech sector
mirrors the pattern of rising and slowing investment
and provides some support for the notion that earn-
ings expectations may have been overly upbeat in the
past.
Under the inﬂuence of ongoing weakness in the
market for heavy trucks, business spending on motor
vehicles declined through most of the year. But
spending stabilized in the fourth quarter, as the gener-
ous incentives on motor vehicles may have helped
boost spending by small businesses as well as con-
sumers. Domestic orders for new aircraft declined
last year, especially after the terrorist attacks last fall,
but these lower orders had not yet affected spending
by year-end because of the very long lags involved in
producing planes. Apart from spending on transporta-
tion and high-tech equipment, real outlays declined
71⁄2 percent last year after having increased 6 percent
in 2000, with the turnaround driven by a sharp swing
in spending on many types of industrial machinery
and on ofﬁce furniture.
Late last year, conditions in some segments of the
high-tech sector showed signs of bottoming. Devel-
opments in the semiconductor industry have
improved, with production increasing during the fall.
Some of the improvement is apparently coming from
increased demand for computers. In the advance esti-
mate from the Commerce Department for the fourth
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150 Federal Reserve Bulletin March 2002quarter, real spending on computers and peripheral
equipment was reported to have surged at an annual
rate of 40 percent. However, spending on communi-
cations equipment, for which evidence of a capital
overhang has been most pronounced, continued to
decline sharply in the fourth quarter, and orders for
communications equipment have yet to display any
convincing signs of turning around. As for other
types of capital equipment, spending continued to
decline in the fourth quarter, but a moderate rebound
in new orders for many types of capital goods from
their autumn lows hinted that a broader ﬁrming of
demand may be under way.
Real business spending for nonresidential struc-
tures also declined sharply in 2001. Construction of
ofﬁce buildings dropped last year after having
increased notably for several years; industrial build-
ing remained fairly steady through the ﬁrst half of
last year but plummeted in the second half. Vacancy
rates for these two types of properties rose consider-
ably, and by year-end the industrial vacancy rate had
reached its highest level since mid-1993. Meanwhile,
spending on non-ofﬁce commercial buildings (a cate-
gory that includes retail, wholesale, and some ware-
house space) decreased moderately last year. Invest-
ment in public utilities moved down as well, a decline
reﬂecting, in part, a cutback in spending for commu-
nications projects such as the installation of ﬁber-
optic networks. Investment in the energy sector was a
pocket of strength last year. Construction of drilling
structures surged in 2000 and much of 2001, as the
industry responded to elevated prices of oil and natu-
ral gas. However, with oil and natural gas prices
reversing their earlier increases, drilling activity
turned down in the latter part of the year.
Inventory Investment
By late 2000, manufacturers were already cutting
production to slow the pace of inventory accumula-
tion as inventories moved up relative to sales. Pro-
duction cuts intensiﬁed in early 2001, and producers
and distributers liquidated inventories at increasing
rates throughout the year. The runoff of inventories
was a major factor holding down GDP growth last
year. Indeed, the arithmetic subtraction from real
GDP growth attributable to the decline in nonfarm
inventory investment was 11⁄2 percentage points over
the four quarters of 2001. However, because sales
also were weakening, inventory-sales ratios remained
high in much of the manufacturing sector, and in
some portions of the wholesale sector as well,
throughout the year.
The motor vehicle sector accounted for about one-
quarter of last year’s overall inventory drawdown.
Late in 2000 and early last year, automakers cut
production in an attempt to clear out excess stocks
held by dealers. By the spring, vehicle assemblies
had stabilized, and the automakers instead dealt with
heavy stocks by further sweetening incentives to
boost sales. By the end of the year, inventories of cars
and light trucks stood at a relatively lean 21⁄4 million
units, nearly 1 million units fewer than were held a
year earlier.
Corporate Proﬁts and Business Finance
The proﬁtability of the U.S. nonﬁnancial corporate
sector suffered a severe blow in 2001. The proﬁt
slump had begun in the fourth quarter of the previous
year, when the economic proﬁts of nonﬁnancial
corporations—that is, book proﬁts from current
production with inventory and capital consump-
tion adjustments compiled by the Commerce
Department—plummeted almost 45 percent at an
annual rate. The ﬁrst three quarters of 2001 brought
little respite, and economic proﬁts spiraled downward
at an average annual rate of 25 percent. The ratio of
the proﬁts of nonﬁnancial corporations to the sector’s
gross nominal output fell to 71⁄2 percent last year, a
level not seen since the early 1980s. Earnings reports
for the fourth quarter indicate that nonﬁnancial corpo-
rate proﬁts continued to fall late in the year.
Business borrowing slowed markedly last year
because ﬁrms slashed investment in ﬁxed capital and
inventories even more than the drop in proﬁts and
other internally generated funds. Business debt
expanded at a 61⁄4 percent annual rate in 2001, well
below the double-digit rates of the two previous











Monetary Policy Report to the Congress 151years, and its composition shifted decidedly toward
longer-term sources of funds. Early in the year, favor-
able conditions in the corporate bond market, com-
bined with ﬁrms’ desire to lock in low interest rates,
prompted investment-grade ﬁrms to issue a high vol-
ume of bonds. They used the proceeds to strengthen
their balance sheets by repaying short-term debt
obligations, reﬁnancing other longer-term debt, and
building up liquid assets. Junk bond issuance was
also strong early in 2001, as speculative-grade yields
fell in response to monetary policy easings, although
investors shunned the riskiest issues amid increasing
economic uncertainty and rising defaults among
below-investment-grade borrowers.
The heavy pace of bond issuance, along with a
reduced need to ﬁnance capital investments, enabled
ﬁrms to decrease their business loans at banks and
their commercial paper outstanding. The move out
of commercial paper also reﬂected elevated credit
spreads between high- and low-tier issuers resulting
from the defaults of California utilities and several
debt downgrades among prominent ﬁrms early in the
year. Announcements of new equity share repurchase
programs thinned considerably in the ﬁrst half of the
year, as ﬁrms sought to conserve their cash buffers
in response to plummeting proﬁts. A signiﬁcant slow-
down in cash-ﬁnanced merger activity further
damped equity retirements, although these retire-
ments still outpaced gross equity issuance, which was
restrained by falling share prices. Over the summer,
issuance of investment-grade bonds dropped off
appreciably. Moreover, market sentiment toward
speculative-grade issues cooled, as further erosion in
that sector’s credit quality took its toll. Business
loans and outstanding commercial paper continued to
contract, and with share prices in the doldrums, non-
ﬁnancial ﬁrms raised only a small amount of funds in
public equity markets in the third quarter.
The terrorist attacks on September 11 constricted
corporate ﬁnancing ﬂows for a time. The stock mar-
ket closed for that week, and trading in corporate
bonds came to a virtual halt. After the shutdown of
the stock market, the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission, in an effort to ensure adequate liquidity,
temporarily lifted some restrictions on ﬁrms’ repur-
chases of their own shares. According to reports from
dealers, this change triggered a spate of repurchases
in the ﬁrst few days after the stock markets reopened
on September 17. When full-scale trading in corpo-
Before-tax proﬁts of nonﬁnancial corporations
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152 Federal Reserve Bulletin March 2002rate bonds resumed on September 17, credit spreads
on corporate bonds widened sharply: Risk spreads on
speculative-grade private debt soared to levels not
seen since late 1991, and spreads on investment-
grade corporate bonds also moved higher, although
by a considerably smaller amount. Against this back-
drop, junk bond issuance nearly dried up for the rest
of the month. Commercial paper rates—even for
top-tier issuers—jumped immediately after the
attacks, as risk of payment delays increased. In
response to elevated rates, some issuers tapped their
backup lines at commercial banks, and business loans
spiked in the weeks after the attacks. Risk spreads for
low-tier borrowers in the commercial paper market
remained elevated, even after market operations had
largely recovered, because of ongoing concerns about
credit quality and ratings downgrades among some
high-proﬁle issuers in the fall.
By early October, the investment-grade corporate
bond market had largely recovered from the disrup-
tions associated with the terrorist attacks, and bond
issuance in that segment of the market picked up
considerably. Firms capitalized on relatively low
longer-term interest rates to pay down short-term
obligations, to reﬁnance existing higher-coupon debt,
and to boost their holdings of liquid assets. With
high-yield bond risk spreads receding moderately,
issuance in the speculative-grade segment of the cor-
porate bond market stirred somewhat from its
moribund state, although investors remained highly
selective. Public equity issuance, after stalling in
September, also regained some ground in the fourth
quarter, spurred by a rebound in stock prices. As was
the case for most of the year, initial public offerings
and venture capital ﬁnancing remained at depressed
levels.
Commercial paper issuance recovered somewhat
early in the fourth quarter as ﬁrms repaid bank loans
made in the immediate aftermath of the terrorist
attacks and as credit spreads for lower-rated issuers
started to narrow. However, the collapse of the Enron
Corporation combined with typical year-end pres-
sures to widen quality spreads in early December. All
told, the volume of domestic nonﬁnancial commer-
cial paper outstanding shrank by one-third over the
year as a whole. Business loans at banks fell further
in the fourth quarter; for the year, business loans
contracted 41⁄4 percent, their ﬁrst annual decline since
1993.
The slowing of sales and the drop in proﬁts caused
corporate credit quality to deteriorate noticeably last
Net interest payments of nonﬁnancial corporations
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Note. The data are daily and extend through February 21, 2002. The series
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paper and the AA rate.
Monetary Policy Report to the Congress 153year. In part because of the decline in market interest
rates, the ratio of net interest payments to cash ﬂow
in the nonﬁnancial corporate sector moved only mod-
estly above the relatively low levels of recent years,
and most ﬁrms did not experience signiﬁcant difﬁcul-
ties servicing their debt. However, many ﬁrms were
downgraded, and evidence of ﬁnancial distress
mounted over the course of the year. The twelve-
month trailing average of the default rate on corpo-
rate bonds nearly tripled last year and by December
ran almost 1⁄2 percentage point higher than its peak in
1991. Delinquency rates on business loans at banks
also rose, although not nearly as dramatically. The
amount of nonﬁnancial debt downgraded by Moody’s
Investors Service last year was more than ﬁve times
the amount upgraded; downgrades were especially
pronounced in the fourth quarter, when ratings agen-
cies lowered debt ratings of ﬁrms in the telecommuni-
cation, energy, and auto sectors.
Commercial mortgage debt, supported by still-
strong construction spending, expanded at a brisk
10 percent pace over the ﬁrst half of 2001. The
growth of commercial mortgage debt edged down
only 1⁄2 percentage point in the second half, despite
a sharp slowdown in business spending on non-
residential structures. As a result, the issuance of
commercial-mortgage-backed securities (CMBS)
maintained a robust pace throughout the year. Avail-
able data indicate some deterioration in the quality of
commercial real estate credit. Delinquency rates on
commercial real estate loans at banks rose steadily in
2001 and have started to edge out of their recent
record-low range. In addition, CMBS delinquency
rates increased, especially toward the end of the year,
amid the rise in ofﬁce vacancy rates. Despite the
erosion in credit quality in commercial real estate and
heavy issuance of CMBS, yield spreads on
investment-grade CMBS over swap rates were about
unchanged over the year, suggesting that investors
view credit problems in this sector as being con-
tained. Commercial banks, however, stiffened their
lending posture in response to eroding prospects for
the commercial real estate sector; signiﬁcant net frac-
tions of loan ofﬁcers surveyed over the course of the
year reported that their institutions had ﬁrmed stan-
dards on commercial real estate loans.
The Government Sector
Federal Government
Deteriorating economic conditions and new ﬁscal
initiatives have led to smaller federal budget sur-
pluses than had been anticipated earlier. The ﬁscal
2001 surplus on a uniﬁed basis was $127 billion, or
about 11⁄4 percent of GDP—well below both the
record $236 billion surplus recorded in ﬁscal 2000
and the $281 billion surplus that the Congressional
Budget Ofﬁce had anticipated for ﬁscal 2001 at this
time last year. Receipts, which had increased at least
6 percent in each of the preceding seven ﬁscal years,
declined around 2 percent in ﬁscal 2001; the rise
in individual tax receipts slowed dramatically and
corporate receipts plunged 27 percent. The lower
receipts reﬂected both the weakening economy—
speciﬁcally, slow growth of personal income, the
drop in corporate proﬁts, and a pattern of declines
in equity values that led to lower net capital gains
realizations—and changes associated with the Eco-
nomic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of
2001. Some provisions of the act went into effect
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154 Federal Reserve Bulletin March 2002immediately, including the rebate checks that were
mailed last summer. In addition, the act shifted some
corporate tax payments into ﬁscal 2002.
Meanwhile, outlays were up 4 percent in ﬁscal
2001; abstracting from a decline in net interest pay-
ments, outlays increased nearly 6 percent, a second
year of increases larger than had prevailed for some
time. Outlays have increased across all major catego-
ries of expenditure, including defense, Medicare and
Medicaid, and social security. As for the part of
federal spending that is counted in GDP, real federal
outlays for consumption and gross investment
increased somewhat more rapidly than in recent years
through the ﬁrst three quarters of 2001 as defense
expenditures picked up. Spending rose faster still in
the fourth quarter because of increases for homeland
security and the additional costs associated with the
war in Afghanistan.
The existence of surpluses through ﬁscal 2001
meant that the federal government continued to con-
tribute to the pool of national saving. Nevertheless,
gross saving by households, businesses, and govern-
ments has been trending down over the past few
years from the recent high of around 19 percent of
GDP in 1998.
The Treasury used federal budget surpluses over
the ﬁrst half of the year to pay down its outstanding
marketable debt. In the third quarter, however, the cut
in personal income taxes and a weakening in receipts
as the economy contracted led the Treasury to reenter
the credit markets as a signiﬁcant borrower of new
funds. The Treasury’s budget position swung back
into surplus late in the year owing to somewhat
stronger-than-expected tax receipts, which helped
push fourth-quarter net borrowing below its third-
quarter level. Despite the increase in the Treasury’s
net borrowing over the second half of the year, pub-
licly held debt remained at only about one-third of
nominal GDP last year, its lowest level since the
mid-1980s and well below the 1993 peak of almost
50 percent.
The terrorist attacks on September 11 and the asso-
ciated disruptions to ﬁnancial markets had some spill-
over effects on Treasury ﬁnancing. On the day of the
attacks, the Treasury cancelled its scheduled bill auc-
tion; over the next several days, it drew down nearly
all of its compensating balances with commercial
banks—about $121⁄2 billion in total—to meet its obli-
gations. On Thursday of that week, the settlement of
securities sold the day before the attacks eased the
Treasury’s immediate cash squeeze, and the incom-
ing stream of estimated quarterly personal income tax
payments provided additional funds. Infrastructure
problems involving the trading and clearing of Trea-
Change in real government expenditures
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Monetary Policy Report to the Congress 155sury securities were largely resolved over the follow-
ing week, and when the Treasury resumed its regular
bill issuance on September 17, exceptionally strong
demand for bills pushed stop-out rates—that is, the
highest yield accepted during the auction—to their
lowest level since 1961. Although the Treasury can-
celled debt buybacks scheduled for late September to
conserve cash, it later announced that buyback opera-
tions would begin again in October.
With its credit needs still limited, the Treasury
announced on October 31 that it was suspending
issuance of nominal and inﬂation-indexed thirty-year
securities. Subsequently, the thirty-year Treasury
bond yield fell sharply, bid-asked spreads on out-
standing bonds widened, and liquidity in the bond
sector deteriorated. Although bid-asked spreads nar-
rowed over the balance of the year, market partici-
pants reported that liquidity in the bond sector
remained below its level before the Treasury’s
announcement. The announcement on October 31
also indicated that after the January 2002 buyback
operations, the Treasury would determine the amount
and timing of buybacks on a quarter-by-quarter basis,
thereby fueling speculation that future buybacks
might be scaled back in light of the changed budget
outlook.
State and Local Governments
Real expenditures for consumption and gross invest-
ment by states and localities rose 5 percent last year
after an increase of 21⁄2 percent in 2000. Much of the
acceleration reﬂected a burst of spending on construc-
tion of schools and other infrastructure needs. In
addition, outlays at the end of last year were boosted
by the cleanup from the September 11 attacks in New
York. As for employment, state and local govern-
ments added jobs in 2001 at a more rapid pace than
they did over the previous year and thereby helped to
offset job losses in the private sector.
The ﬁscal condition of state and local governments
has been strained by the deterioration in economic
performance. State governments are considering a
variety of actions to achieve budget balance in the
current ﬁscal year. Most states are intending to cut
planned expenditures, and many are considering
drawing down rainy-day funds, which governments
had built up in earlier years. According to the
National Conference of State Legislators, these rainy-
day funds stood at the relatively high level of
$23 billion at the end of ﬁscal 2001 (June 30).
Moreover, some states that had planned to fund capi-
tal expenditures with current receipts appear to be
shifting to debt ﬁnancing. Finally, a few states are
considering actions such as postponing tax cuts that
were enacted earlier.
Debt of the state and local government sector
expanded rapidly last year after slow growth in 2000.
Gross issuance of long-term municipal bonds acceler-
ated over the ﬁrst half of 2001 as state and local
governments took advantage of lower yields to refund
outstanding debt. Spurred by falling interest rates and
declining tax revenues, these governments continued
to issue long-term bonds to ﬁnance new capital
projects at a rapid clip over the second half of the
year. Despite a deterioration in tax receipts, credit
quality in the municipal market remained high in
2001. Late in the year, however, signs of weakness
had emerged, as the pace of net credit-ratings
upgrades slowed noticeably. Especially signiﬁcant
problems continue to plague California and New
York, both of which saw their debt ratings lowered in
November. In California, the problems were attrib-
uted to declining tax revenues and difﬁculties related
to the state’s electricity crisis earlier in the year,
while New York’s slip in credit quality resulted not
only from deteriorating tax receipts but also from
fears of higher-than-expected costs related to clean
up and rebuilding after the terrorist attacks.
The External Sector
Trade and the Current Account
The U.S. current account deﬁcit narrowed signiﬁ-
cantly during 2001, with both imports and exports of
goods and services falling sharply in response to a
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156 Federal Reserve Bulletin March 2002goods and services narrowed to $333 billion at an
annual rate in the fourth quarter of 2001 from
$401 billion at the end of the previous year. In
addition, the deﬁcit was temporarily reduced further
in the third quarter because service import payments
were lowered by a large one-time estimated insur-
ance payment from foreign insurers (reported on an
accrual basis) related to the events of September 11.1
Excluding the estimated insurance ﬁgure, the current
account deﬁcit was $434 billion at an annual rate
over the ﬁrst three quarters of the year, or 41⁄4 percent
of GDP, compared with $445 billion and 41⁄2 percent
for the year 2000. Net investment income payments
were about the same during the ﬁrst three quarters of
2001 as in the corresponding period a year earlier;
higher net payments on our growing net portfolio
liability position were offset by higher net direct
investment receipts.
U.S. real exports were hit by slower growth abroad,
continued appreciation of the dollar, and plunging
global demand for high-tech products. Real exports
of goods and services fell 11 percent over the four
quarters of 2001, with double-digit declines begin-
ning in the second quarter. Service receipts decreased
7 percent; all of the decline came after the events of
September 11. Receipts from travel and passenger
fares, which plunged following the terrorist attacks,
were about one-fourth lower in the fourth quarter
than in the second quarter. Receipts from foreigners
for other services changed little over the year. Exports
declined in almost all major goods categories, with
the largest drops by far in high-tech capital goods and
other machinery. Two exceptions were exports of
automotive products, which rose during the second
and third quarters (largely parts to Canada and
Mexico destined ultimately for use in U.S. markets,
and vehicles to Canada), and agricultural goods.
About 45 percent of U.S. exports of goods were
capital equipment; 20 percent were industrial sup-
plies; and 5 percent to 10 percent each were agricul-
tural, automotive, consumer, and other goods. The
value of exported goods declined at double-digit rates
for almost all major market destinations. Even
exports to Canada and Mexico declined sharply,
despite support from two-way trade with the United
States in such sectors as automotive products.
As growth of the U.S. economy slowed noticeably,
real imports of goods and services turned down and
declined 8 percent for 2001 as a whole. Service
payments dropped 15 percent last year. The plunge in
outlays for travel and passenger fares after September
11 held down total real service payments, bringing
their level in the fourth quarter 15 percent below that
in the second quarter. Spending on services other
than travel and passenger fares changed little during
the year.2 Imported goods fell 6 percent last year,
with much of the decrease in capital goods (comput-
ers, semiconductors, and other machinery). In con-
trast, real imports of automotive products, consumer
goods, oil, and other industrial supplies were little
changed, and imports of foods rose. The pattern of
import growth appears to have shifted toward the end
of the year. Imports of real non-oil goods declined at
about a 10 percent annual rate during the ﬁrst three
quarters of the year but fell less rapidly in the fourth
quarter. The price of imported non-oil goods, after
rising in the ﬁrst quarter, declined at an annual rate of
about 6 percent from the second quarter through the
fourth quarter, led by decreases in the price of
imported industrial supplies.
The value of imported oil fell more than one-third
over the four quarters of 2001, a drop resulting almost
entirely from a sharp decline in oil prices. The spot
price of West Texas intermediate (WTI) crude
decreased about $10 per barrel during the year, with
much of the decline occurring after September 11.
During the ﬁrst eight months of 2001, the spot price
of WTI averaged $28 per barrel as weakened demand
for oil and increased non-OPEC supply were largely
1. The ‘‘insurance payment’’ component of imported services is
calculated as the value of premiums paid to foreign companies less the
amount of losses recovered from foreign companies. In the third
quarter, the estimated size of losses recovered far exceeded the amount
paid for insurance premiums, resulting in a negative recorded insur-
ance payment. According to NIPA accounting, the entire amount of a
recovery is recorded in the quarter in which the incident occurred.
2. According to NIPA accounting, the value of the one-time insur-
ance payments by foreign insurers is not reﬂected in NIPA real
imports of services. The deﬂator for service imports was adjusted
down for the third quarter to offset the lower value of service imports;
the deﬂator returned to its usual value in the fourth quarter.










Monetary Policy Report to the Congress 157offset by OPEC production restraint. In the wake of
the terrorist attacks, oil prices dropped sharply in
response to a decline in jet fuel consumption, weaker
economic activity, and reassurance from Saudi Ara-
bia that supply would be forthcoming. Oil prices
continued to drift lower during the fourth quarter,
reﬂecting OPEC’s apparent unwillingness to con-
tinue to sacriﬁce market share in order to defend
higher oil prices. In late December, however, OPEC
worked out an arrangement in which it agreed to
reduce its production targets an additional 1.5 million
barrels per day, contingent on the pledges from sev-
eral non-OPEC producers (Angola, Mexico, Norway,
Oman, and Russia) to reduce oil exports a total of
462,500 barrels per day. Given the uncertainty over
the extent to which these reductions will actually be
implemented and the comfortable level of oil inven-
tories, the spot price of WTI remained near $20 per
barrel in early 2002.
Financial Account
The slowing of U.S. and foreign economic growth
over the course of last year had noticeable effects on
the composition of U.S. capital ﬂows, especially
when the slowing became more pronounced in the
second half. On balance, net private capital ﬂowed in
at a pace only slightly below the record set in 2000,
including unprecedented net inﬂows through private
securities transactions.
During the ﬁrst half of 2001, sagging stock prices
and signs of slower growth brought a shift in the
types of U.S. securities demanded by private foreign-
ers but did not reduce the overall demand for them.
Indeed, during the ﬁrst half, foreign private purchases
of U.S. securities averaged $137 billion per quarter, a
rate well above the record $109 billion pace set in
2000. A slowing of foreign purchases of U.S. equi-
ties, relative to 2000, was more than offset by a
pickup in foreign purchases of corporate and agency
bonds. In addition, private foreigners, who had sold a
signiﬁcant quantity of Treasury securities during
2000, roughly halted their sales in the ﬁrst half of
2001. The increased capital inﬂows arising from
larger foreign purchases of U.S. securities in the ﬁrst
half was only partly offset by an increase in the pace
at which U.S. residents acquired foreign securities,
especially equities.
The pattern of private securities transactions
changed signiﬁcantly in the third quarter: Foreign
purchases of U.S. equities slowed markedly, and
U.S. investors shifted from net purchases of foreign
securities to net sales. However, the reduced ﬂows
in the third quarter seem to have reﬂected short-lived
reactions to events in the quarter. Preliminary data for
the fourth quarter show a signiﬁcant bounceback in











Note. The data are monthly; the last observation for oil is the average of
trading days through February 21, 2002; the last observation for other commodi-
ties is December 2001. The oil price is the spot price of West Texas intermediate
crude oil. The price of other commodities is a weighted average of thirty-nine
nonfuel primary-commodity prices from the International Monetary Fund.
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158 Federal Reserve Bulletin March 2002foreign purchases of U.S. securities and a return to
purchases of foreign securities by U.S. residents.
The changing economic climate also affected direct
investment capital ﬂows. During 2000, foreign direct
investment in the United States averaged more than
$70 billion per quarter. These ﬂows slowed to less
than $60 billion per quarter in the ﬁrst half and then
dropped to only $26 billion in the third quarter (the
last available data). The drop resulted in part from a
decline in the outlook for corporate proﬁts and a
signiﬁcant reduction in general merger and acquisi-
tion activity. By contrast, U.S. direct investment
abroad picked up over the course of 2001. The third
quarter outﬂow of $52 billion—a record—reﬂected
both a large merger and robust retained earnings by
the foreign afﬁliates of U.S. ﬁrms. Capital inﬂows
from ofﬁcial sources were relatively modest in 2001,




Last year’s weakening in economic activity took its
toll on the labor market. Payroll employment edged
up early last year and then dropped nearly 11⁄2 million
by January 2002. Declines were particularly large in
manufacturing, which has shed one in twelve jobs
since mid-2000. Job cuts accelerated in the months
following the terrorist attacks of September 11, with declines occurring in a wide variety of industries.
The unemployment rate moved up from 4 percent in
late 2000 to 5.8 percent by December 2001. In Janu-
ary 2002, the unemployment rate edged down to
5.6 percent.
Early last year, employment in manufacturing,
which had been trending down for several years,
began to decline more rapidly. Job losses were wide-
spread within the manufacturing sector but were most
pronounced in durable-goods industries, such as those
producing electrical and industrial machinery and
metals. Employment at help supply ﬁrms and in
wholesale trade—industries that are directly related
to manufacturing—also began to decline. Outside of
manufacturing and its related industries, private pay-
rolls continued to increase robustly in the ﬁrst quarter
of last year, but hiring then slowed, although it
remained positive, on net, in the second and third
quarters. Construction payrolls increased into the
spring but ﬂattened out thereafter. Employment at
retail trade establishments also continued to increase
moderately through the spring but began to decline in
the late summer. In services industries other than help










Note. The data extend through January 2002. The augmented umemploy-
ment rate is the number of unemployed plus those who are not in the labor force
and want a job, divided by the civilian labor force plus those who are not in the
labor force and want a job. In January 1994, a redesigned survey was intro-
duced; data for the augmented rate from that point on are not directly compa-
rable with those of earlier periods. For the augmented rate, the data are quarterly
through December 1993 and monthly thereafter; for the civilian labor force rate,
the data are monthly.
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Note. Manufacturing and related industries includes establishments in manu-
facturing, wholesale trade, and help supply services. Non-manufacturing-related
industries includes the remainder of private nonfarm establishments.
Monetary Policy Report to the Congress 159supply ﬁrms—a broad group that accounted for
nearly half of the private payroll increases over the
preceding several years—job gains slowed but
remained positive in the second and third quarters of
last year. In all, private payroll employment declined
about 115,000 per month in the second and third
quarters, and the unemployment rate moved up
steadily to 41⁄2 percent by the spring and to nearly
5 percent by August.
The labor market was especially hard hit by the
terrorist attacks. Although labor demand was weak
prior to the attacks, the situation turned far worse
following the events of September 11, and private
payrolls plunged more than 400,000 per month on
average in October and November. Employment fell
substantially not only in manufacturing and in indus-
tries directly affected by the attacks, such as air
transportation, hotels, and restaurants, but also in a
wide variety of other industries such as construction
and much of the retail sector.
Employment continued to decline in December
and January but much less than in the preceding two
months. Manufacturing and its related industries lost
jobs at a slower pace, and employment leveled off in
other private industries. The unemployment rate
moved up to 5.8 percent in December but then ticked
down to 5.6 percent in January. The recent reversal of
the October and November spikes in new claims for
unemployment insurance and in the level of insured
unemployment also point to some improvement in
labor market conditions early this year.
Productivity and Labor Costs
Given economic conditions, growth of labor produc-
tivity was impressive in 2001. Productivity growth
typically drops when the economy softens, partly
because businesses tend not to shed workers in pro-
portion to reduced demand. Last year, however, out-
put per hour in the nonfarm business sector increased
a relatively solid 11⁄2 percent, according to the
advance estimate, after having risen 21⁄2 percent in
2000—a mild deceleration by past cyclical standards.
Indeed, productivity is estimated to have increased at
an annual rate of more than 2 percent in the second
half of the year, an impressive performance during a
period when real GDP was, on net, contracting. The
buoyancy of productivity during 2001 provides fur-
ther support to the view that the underlying trend of
productivity growth has stepped up notably in recent
years.
Hourly labor compensation costs increased more
slowly last year than in 2000, although different
compensation measures paint different pictures of the
magnitude of that deceleration. The slowing likely
reﬂected the inﬂuence of the soft labor market,
energy-driven declines in price inﬂation toward the
latter part of the year, and subdued inﬂation expec-
tations. Compensation probably was also held down
by a reduction in variable pay, such as bonuses that
are tied to company performance and stock-option
activity.
According to the employment cost index, hourly
compensation costs increased 41⁄4 percent during
2001, down from a 41⁄2 percent increase in 2000; both
the wages and salaries and beneﬁts components
recorded slightly smaller increases. The deceleration
in the index for wages and salaries was concentrated
among sales workers, whose wages often include a
substantial commission component and so are espe-
cially sensitive to cyclical developments. Although
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Note. For the employment cost index (ECI), change is from December to
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excluding farm and household workers. Nonfarm compensation per hour is for
the nonfarm business sector.
160 Federal Reserve Bulletin March 2002the increase in employers’ cost of beneﬁts slowed
overall, the cost of providing health insurance
increased more than 9 percent last year; the rise
continued this component’s accelerating contribution
to labor costs over the past few years after a period of
restrained cost increases in the mid-1990s.
An alternative measure of hourly compensation is
the BLS’s measure of compensation per hour in the
nonfarm business sector, which is derived from com-
pensation information in the national accounts; this
measure increased 4 percent last year, a very large
drop from the 73⁄4 percent increase registered in 2000.
One reason that these two compensation measures
may diverge is that only nonfarm compensation per
hour captures the cost of stock options. Although the
two compensation measures differ in numerous other
respects as well, the much sharper deceleration in
nonfarm compensation per hour may indicate that
stock option exercises leveled off or declined in 2001
in response to the fall in equity values. However,
because nonfarm compensation per hour can be
revised substantially, one must be cautious in inter-
preting the most recent quarterly ﬁgures from this
series.
Unit labor costs, the ratio of hourly compensation
to output per hour in the nonfarm business sector,
increased about 2 percent last year. Although down
from a huge 5 percent increase in 2000 that reﬂected
that year’s surge in nonfarm compensation per hour,
the ﬁgure for 2001 is still a little higher than the
moderate increases seen over the preceding several
years. Last year’s increase in unit labor costs was
held up by the smaller productivity increases that
accompanied weak economic activity; accordingly,
subsequent increases in unit labor costs would be
held down if output per hour begins to increase more
rapidly as the economy strengthens.
Prices
Inﬂation declined in 2001 largely because of a steep
drop in energy prices. The chain-type price index for
personal consumption expenditures (PCE) increased
1.3 percent last year after having increased 2.6 per-
cent in 2000; the turnaround in consumer energy
prices accounted for almost all of that deceleration.
Increases in PCE prices excluding food and energy
items also slowed a little last year after having moved
up in 2000. The chain-type price index for gross
domestic purchases—the broadest price measure for
domestically purchased goods and services—
decelerated considerably last year. The small increase
in this index reﬂected both the drop in energy prices
and a resumption of rapid declines for prices of
investment goods, especially computers, following a
period of unusual ﬁrmness in 2000. The price index
for GDP—the broadest price measure for domesti-
cally produced goods and services—posted a smaller
deceleration of about 1⁄2 percentage point between
2000 and 2001 because lower oil prices have a
smaller weight in U.S. production than in U.S.
purchases.
Consumer energy prices continued to move higher
through the early months of 2001 before turning
down sharply in the second half of the year. Despite
the fact that crude oil prices were declining over the
ﬁrst half of the year, retail gasoline prices increased
at an annual rate of 8 percent during that period. The
sizable increase in margins on gasoline reﬂected both
reﬁnery disruptions and low inventory levels going
into the summer driving season. But gasoline prices
fell sharply thereafter as reﬁneries came back on line,
imports of gasoline picked up, and crude oil prices
moved considerably lower over the latter half of the
year. In all, gasoline prices were down 19 percent
over the year as a whole. Heating oil prices reﬂected
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Monetary Policy Report to the Congress 161crude oil developments more directly and declined-
sharply through most of the year. Meanwhile, spot
prices of natural gas peaked in January 2001 at the
extraordinarily high level of nearly $10 per million
BTUs, and prices at the consumer level continued
to surge in the ﬁrst few months of the year. These
increases reﬂected the pressure from ongoing strength
in demand coupled with unusually cold weather early
last winter that left stocks at very low levels. But the
situation improved as expanded supply allowed
stocks to be replenished: Spot prices reversed those
earlier increases, and prices of consumer natural gas
declined substantially through the rest of the year.
In contrast, electricity prices rose through most of
last year. The increases reﬂected the effects of the
earlier rises in the prices of natural gas and coal on
fuel costs of utilities as well as problems with elec-
tricity generation in California. California was able to
avoid serious power disruptions last summer because
high electricity prices, weak economic activity, and
moderate weather all helped keep demand in check.
Consumer food prices increased more rapidly last
year, rising about 3 percent after having risen only
21⁄2 percent in 2000. Early in the year, strong demand,
both domestic and foreign, led to large increases
in livestock prices—especially beef. But these prices
softened later in the year under the inﬂuence of
higher supplies, lower domestic demand, and foreign
outbreaks of mad cow disease, which apparently
damped demand for beef no matter where produced.
Excluding food and energy items, PCE prices rose
1.6 percent last year, a small deceleration from its
1.9 percent increase over 2000. That deceleration was
concentrated in prices of goods, with prices espe-
cially soft for motor vehicles and apparel. By con-
trast, prices of many services continued to accelerate
last year. In particular, shelter costs—which include
residential rent, the imputed rent of owner-occupied
housing, and hotel and motel prices—increased
41⁄4 percent last year after having risen 31⁄2 percent in
2000.
Standing somewhat in contrast to the small decel-
eration in core PCE prices, the core consumer price
index (CPI) increased 23⁄4 percent last year, about the
same rate as in 2000. Although components of the
CPI are key inputs of the PCE price index, the two
price measures differ in a variety of ways. One impor-
tant difference is that the PCE measure is broader
in scope; it includes expenditures made by nonproﬁt
institutions and consumption of items such as check-
ing services that banks provide without explicit
charge. Prices for the PCE categories that are outside
the scope of the CPI decelerated notably in 2001 and
accounted for much of the differential movements of
inﬂation measured by the two price indexes. Another
difference is that the CPI places a larger weight on
housing than does the PCE price index, and last
year’s acceleration of housing prices therefore
boosted the CPI relative to the PCE measure.
The leveling off or decline in core consumer price
inﬂation reﬂects a variety of factors, including the
weakening of economic activity and the accompany-
ing slackening of resource utilization; the decline in
energy prices that reduced ﬁrms’ costs; and continu-
ing intense competitive pressures in product markets.
These factors also likely helped to reduce inﬂation
expectations late last year, and this reduction itself
may be contributing to lower inﬂation. According to
the Michigan SRC, median one-year inﬂation expec-
tations, which had held near 3 percent through 2000
and into last summer, moved down to 23⁄4 percent in
the third quarter and plummeted to 1 percent or lower
in October and November. Falling energy prices and
widespread reports of discounting following the Sep-
tember 11 attacks likely played a role in causing this
sharp break in expectations. Part of this drop was
reversed in December, and since then, inﬂation
expectations have remained around 2 percent—a rate
still well below the levels that had prevailed earlier.
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Consumer price index
Chain-type price index for PCE
Percent
Alternative measures of price change
Percent
Price measure 2000 2001
Chain-type
Gross domestic product .................. 2.4 1.8
Gross domestic purchases ................ 2.5 1.1
Personal consumption expenditures ....... 2.6 1.3
Excluding food and energy ............. 1.9 1.6
Fixed-weight
Consumer price index .................... 3.4 1.9
Excluding food and energy ............. 2.5 2.7
Note. Changes are based on quarterly averages and are measured to the
fourth quarter of the year indicated from the fourth quarter of the preceding year.
162 Federal Reserve Bulletin March 2002Meanwhile, the Michigan SRC’s measure of longer-
term inﬂation expectations, which had also remained
close to 3 percent through 2000 and the ﬁrst half of
2001, ticked down to 23⁄4 percent in October and
stood at that level early this year.
U.S. Financial Markets
As a consequence of the Federal Reserve’s aggres-
sive easing of the stance of monetary policy in 2001,
interest rates on short- and intermediate-term Trea-
sury securities fell substantially over the course of the
year. Longer-term Treasury bond yields, however,
ended the year about unchanged, on balance. These
rates had already fallen appreciably in late 2000 in
anticipation of monetary policy easing. They may
also have been held up last year by an increased
likelihood of federal budget deﬁcits and, except in
the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks, by
investors’ optimism about future economic prospects.
Despite this optimism, the slowdown in ﬁnal demand,
a slump in corporate earnings, and a marked deterio-
ration in credit quality of businesses in a number
of sectors made investors more wary about risk.
Although interest rates on higher-rated investment-
grade corporate bonds generally moved in line with
those on comparably dated government securities,
lower-rated ﬁrms found credit to be considerably
more expensive, as risk spreads on speculative-grade
debt soared for most of the year before narrowing
somewhat over the last few months. Interest rates on
commercial paper and business loans fell last year by
about as much as the federal funds rate, but risk
spreads generally remained in the elevated range. In
addition, commercial banks tightened standards and
terms for business borrowers throughout the year.
Equity prices were exceptionally volatile and fell
further, on balance, in 2001.
Increased caution on the part of lenders did not
appear to materially damp aggregate credit ﬂows.
Private borrowing was robust last year, especially
when compared with the marked slowing in nominal
spending. Relatively low long-term interest rates
encouraged both businesses and households to
concentrate borrowing in longer-term instruments,
thereby locking in lower debt-service obligations.
The proceeds of long-term borrowing were also used
to strengthen balance sheets by building stocks of
liquid assets. A shift toward safer and more liquid
asset holdings showed through in rapid growth of
M2, which was spurred further by reduced short-term
market interest rates and elevated stock market
volatility.
Interest Rates
Short-term market interest rates moved down with
the FOMC’s cumulative cut in the target federal
funds rate of 43⁄4 percentage points, and yields on
intermediate-term Treasury securities declined almost
2 percentage points. Longer-term interest rates had
already fallen in the latter part of 2000, when inves-
tors began to anticipate signiﬁcant policy easing in
response to weakening economic growth. As the
FOMC aggressively eased the stance of monetary
policy during the winter and spring, investors’ expec-
tations of a prompt revival in economic activity took
hold and were manifested in a sharp upward tilt of
money market futures rates and an appreciable rise
in longer-term interest rates over the second quarter.
However, signs of the anticipated economic turn-
around failed to materialize as the summer pro-
gressed. Indeed, the weakening in economic activity
was becoming more widespread, which prompted
expectations of further monetary policy easing over
the near term, and longer-term interest rates turned
down again.
The terrorist attacks of September 11 dramatically
redrew the picture of the nation’s near-term eco-
nomic prospects. Market participants lowered mark-
edly their expected trajectory for the path of the
federal funds rate in the immediate aftermath of the
attacks, and revisions to policy expectations, com-
bined with considerable ﬂight-to-safety demands, cut
short- and intermediate-term Treasury yields substan-
tially over subsequent days. The FOMC, confronted
with evidence of additional weakness in ﬁnal demand
and prices, eased policy further over the balance of
the year, and short-term market interest rates con-
tinued to decline. In early November, however,
intermediate- and long-term interest rates turned up,
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Monetary Policy Report to the Congress 163as it became apparent that the economic fallout from
the attacks would be more limited than some had
originally feared, and as military success in Afghani-
stan bolstered investors’ conﬁdence and moderated
safe-haven demands. By the end of the year, yields on
intermediate-term Treasury securities had reversed
about half of their post–September 11 decline, while
yields on longer-term Treasury securities had risen
enough to top their pre-attack levels. In early 2002,
however, yields on intermediate- and longer-term
Treasuries edged down again, as market participants
trimmed their expectations for the strength of the
economic rebound, and the Congress failed to move
forward with additional ﬁscal stimulus.
Yields on higher quality investment-grade corpo-
rate bonds generally followed those on comparably-
dated Treasury securities last year, although risk
spreads widened moderately before narrowing over
the last few months. In contrast, interest rates on
speculative-grade corporate debt increased steadily in
2001, as risk spreads ballooned in response to mount-
ing signs of ﬁnancial distress among weaker ﬁrms.
Even with a considerable narrowing over the ﬁnal
two months of the year, risk spreads on below-
investment-grade bonds remained quite wide.
Spreads for high-yield bonds edged down further in
2002 after rising sharply in early January, when sev-
eral important technology and telecommunications
companies revised down their earnings forecasts or
released corrections to past earnings statements.
Interest rates on commercial and industrial (C&I)
loans at banks fell last year by about as much as the
federal funds rate. According to the Federal Reserve’s
quarterly Survey of Terms of Business Lending, the
spread over the target federal funds rate of the aver-
age interest rate on C&I loans varied somewhat over
the year, falling for a while then rising sharply
between August and November; nonetheless, it has
generally remained in the elevated range that has
persisted since late 1998. The same survey also indi-
cated that over the course of last year commercial
banks, like other lenders, have become especially
cautious about lending to marginal credits, as indi-
cated by the average spread on riskier C&I loans not
made under a previous commitment, which soared in
2001.
Equity Markets
The exceptional volatility of equity prices in 2001
likely reﬂected the dramatic ﬂuctuations in investors’
assessment of the outlook for the economy and corpo-
rate earnings. Share prices tumbled early last year, as
pessimism and uncertainty about the direction of the
economy were intensiﬁed by a spate of negative
earnings announcements and proﬁt warnings in Feb-
ruary and March. The pronounced sell-off of equities
came to a halt at the end of the ﬁrst quarter, with the
Wilshire 5000—a very broad index of stock prices—
down about 13 percent, while the tech-heavy Nasdaq
ended the ﬁrst quarter at its lowest level since 1998
and more than 60 percent below its record high
reached in March of 2000.
Companies, especially in the technology sector,
reported weak proﬁts for the ﬁrst quarter, but their
announcements generally surpassed analysts’ sharply









Note. The data are monthly averages and extend through January 2002. The
AA rate is calculated from bonds in the Merrill Lynch AA index with seven to
ten years remaining maturity. The high-yield rate is the yield on the Merrill
Lynch 175 high-yield index.
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Source. Federal Reserve Survey of Terms of Business Lending.
164 Federal Reserve Bulletin March 2002reduction in the federal funds rate over March and
April, investors became more conﬁdent that an
improvement in economic conditions was in train,
and equity prices rallied; the rebound was particu-
larly strong for technology companies—the Nasdaq
rose almost 40 percent between April and the end of
May. The forward momentum in equity markets was
checked in June, however, in part because analysts
slashed their estimates for near-term corporate earn-
ings growth. Although the stock market initially
proved resilient in the face of the bleak proﬁt news,
suggesting that weak earnings had been largely
anticipated by investors, the steady barrage of dismal
economic news—particularly in the technology and
telecommunications sectors—started to exert down-
ward pressure on share prices by early August. The
slide in stock prices intensiﬁed in early September,
with technology stocks taking an exceptional drub-
bing. By September 10, the Wilshire 5000 was down
almost 10 percent from the end of July, while the
Nasdaq had lost more than 16 percent.
The attacks on September 11, a Tuesday, caused
stock markets to shut down and to remain closed for
the rest of that week. Trading resumed in an orderly
fashion on Monday, September 17, but the day ended
with the market as a whole down about 5 percent—
with airline and hotel stocks pounded most—and
trading volume on the New York Stock Exchange
hitting a record high. Major stock price indexes,
which sagged further in subsequent days and weeks,
were weighed down by investors’ more pessimistic
evaluation of the near-term economic outlook and by
sizable downward revisions to analysts’ earnings pro-
jections for the rest of 2001. By the third week of the
month, broad stock price indexes had fallen a total
of 12 percent from their levels on September 10.
In late September, stock prices staged a comeback
that lasted through the fourth quarter, as incoming
information suggested that the economy had proven
remarkably resilient and economic prospects were
improving. On the perception that the worst for the
technology sector would soon pass, share prices of
ﬁrms in technology industries jumped sharply, lifting
the Nasdaq more than 35 percent from its September
nadir. On balance, last year’s gyrations in stock prices
left the Wilshire 5000 down about 10 percent, while
the Nasdaq fell 20 percent. The widespread decline in
equity prices through the ﬁrst three quarters of 2001
is estimated to have wiped out nearly $31⁄2 trillion in
household wealth, translating into 81⁄4 percent of total
household net worth. Of this total, however, about
$11⁄4 trillion was restored by the stock market rally in
the fourth quarter. Moreover, the level of household
net worth at the end of last year was still almost
50 percent higher than it was at the end of 1995,
when stepped-up productivity gains had begun to
induce investors to boost signiﬁcantly their expecta-
tions of long-term earnings growth. In January and
early February of 2002, investors reacted to generally
disappointing news about expected earnings, espe-
cially in the telecommunications sector, and to con-
cerns about corporate accounting practices by erasing
some of the fourth-quarter gain in equity prices.
Despite this decline, the price-earnings ratio for the
S&P 500 index (calculated using operating earnings
expected over the next year) remained close to its
level at the beginning of 2001. The relatively elevated
ratio reﬂected lower market interest rates as well as
investor anticipation of a return to robust earnings
growth.
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The growth of the debt of nonfederal sectors was
strong over the ﬁrst half of the year, as the decline in
longer-term interest rates during the ﬁnal months of
2000 prompted some opportunistic tapping of bond
markets by businesses and helped keep the expansion
of household credit brisk. However, the combination
of a stepdown in the growth of consumer durables
purchases, a further drop in capital expenditures, and
a substantial inventory liquidation over the second
half of the year resulted in a signiﬁcantly slower pace
of private borrowing. On balance, growth of nonfed-
eral debt retreated about 1 percentage point in 2001,
to 71⁄2 percent. Federal debt continued to contract
early last year; it then turned up as the budget fell
into a deﬁcit reﬂecting the implementation of the tax
cut, the effect of the weaker economy on tax receipts,
and emergency spending in the wake of the terrorist
attacks. As a result, the federal government paid
down only 11⁄4 percent of its debt, on net, over 2001,
compared with 63⁄4 percent in the previous year. With
nominal GDP decelerating sharply, the ratio of nonﬁ-
nancial debt to GDP moved up notably in 2001, more
than reversing its decrease in the previous year.
The economic slowdown and the decline in market
interest rates last year left a noticeable imprint on the
composition of ﬁnancial ﬂows, with borrowing by
businesses and households migrating toward longer-
term bond and mortgage markets. As a consequence,
credit at depository institutions expanded sluggishly
over the year. Growth of loans at commercial banks
dropped off sharply, from 12 percent in 2000
to 21⁄4 percent in 2001. The slowdown in total
bank credit—after adjustments for mark-to-market
accounting rules—was less severe, because banks
acquired securities, largely mortgage-backed securi-
ties, at a brisk pace throughout the year. A healthy
banking sector served as an important safety valve
for several weeks after September 11, as businesses
tapped backup lines of credit to overcome problems
associated with the repayment of maturing commer-
cial paper and issuance of new paper. Moreover, with
payment ﬂows temporarily interrupted by the terror-
ist attacks, a substantial volume of overdrafts was
created, causing a spike in the ‘‘other’’ loan category
that includes loans to depository institutions. By the
end of October, however, the disruptions to business
ﬁnancing patterns and payment systems that bloated
bank balance sheets had largely dissipated, and loans
contracted sharply.
Commercial banks reported a marked deterioration
in loan performance last year. Delinquency and
charge-off rates on C&I loans trended up appreciably,
although they remained well below rates recorded
during the 1990-91 recession. Delinquency rates on
credit card accounts increased for the second year in
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166 Federal Reserve Bulletin March 2002a row, reaching 5 percent for the ﬁrst time since early
1992. Banks responded to the deteriorating business
and household balance sheets by tightening credit
standards and terms for both types of loan, according
to the Federal Reserve’s Senior Loan Ofﬁcer Opinion
Survey on Bank Lending Practices. Banks indicated
that they had tightened business lending policies in
response to greater uncertainty about the economic
outlook and their reduced tolerance for risk. Simi-
larly, the net fractions of banks reporting that they
had tightened standards for both credit card and other
consumer loans rose markedly over the ﬁrst half of
last year. As household ﬁnancial conditions contin-
ued to slip, the net proportion of banks that tightened
standards on consumer loans remained at an elevated
level in the second half of the year.
In response to rising levels of delinquent and
charged-off loans, commercial banks signiﬁcantly
boosted the rate of provisioning for loan losses last
year, which, along with reduced income from capital
market activities, cut into the banking sector’s proﬁts.
Nonetheless, through the third quarter of 2001—
the latest period for which Call Report data are avail-
able—measures of industry proﬁtability remained
near the elevated range recorded for the past several
years, and banks continued to hold substantial capital
to absorb losses. Indeed, virtually all assets were at
well-capitalized banks at the end of the third quarter,
and the substitution of securities for loans on banks’
balance sheets also helped edge up risk-based capital
ratios. In the fourth quarter, a number of large banks
saw their proﬁts decline further because of their
exposure to Enron and, to a lesser extent, Argentina.
On the positive side, wider net interest margins
helped support proﬁts throughout 2001.
The Monetary Aggregates
The broad monetary aggregates grew very rapidly
in 2001. Over the four quarters of the year, M2
increased 101⁄4 percent, a rate signiﬁcantly above the
pace of the past several years. Because the rates of
return provided by many components of M2 move
sluggishly, the swift decline in short-term market
interest rates last year signiﬁcantly lowered the
opportunity cost of holding M2 assets, especially for
Net percentage of domestic banks tightening standards on
credit card and selected commercial and industrial loans
C&I loans to large
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Note. The data extend through January 2002 and are based on a survey
generally conducted four times per year. Large and medium-sized ﬁrms are
those with annual sales of $50 million or more. Net percentage is percentage
reporting a tightening less percentage reporting an easing.
Source. Federal Reserve Senior Loan Ofﬁcer Opinion Survey on Bank
Lending Practices.
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Note. M2 consists of currency, travelers checks, demand deposits, other
checkable deposits, savings deposits (including money market deposit accounts),
small-denomination time deposits, and balances in retail money market funds.
Annual growth rates are computed from fourth-quarter averages.
Monetary Policy Report to the Congress 167its liquid deposits (the sum of checking and savings
accounts) and retail money funds components. More-
over, negative returns and elevated volatility in equity
markets likely raised household demand for M2
assets through the fall. An unprecedented level of
mortgage reﬁnancing activity (which results in pre-
payments that temporarily accumulate in deposit
accounts before being distributed to investors in
mortgage-backed securities), as well as increased for-
eign demand for U.S. currency, also bolstered the
growth of M2 over the course of the year.
Involuntary accumulation of liquid deposits result-
ing from payment system disruptions after the terror-
ist attacks, combined with elevated safe-haven
demands, caused M2 to surge temporarily in the
weeks following September 11. At the same time,
plunging equity prices led to a sharp step-up in the
growth of retail money market mutual funds. After a
substantial unwinding of distortions to money ﬂows
in October, M2 growth over the balance of the year
was spurred by further declines in its opportunity cost
resulting from additional monetary policy easings
and by heightened volatility in equity markets. The
hefty advance in M2 last year outpaced the anemic
expansion of nominal income, and M2 velocity—the
ratio of nominal GDP to M2—posted a record
decline.
M3—the broadest monetary aggregate—grew
13 percent over 2001. In addition to the surge in its
M2 component, huge inﬂows into institutional money
funds boosted M3 growth. Investors’ appetite for
these instruments was enormous last year because
their returns were unusually attractive as they lagged
the steep decline in market interest rates. The slow-
down in the growth of bank credit over the summer,
which resulted in a contraction in managed liabilities,
damped the rise in M3 somewhat. The velocity of M3
dropped for the seventh year in the row, to a record
low.
International Developments
Economic activity in foreign economies weakened
substantially in 2001. Early in the year, activity
abroad was depressed by high oil prices, the global
slump in the high-tech sector, and spillover from the
U.S. economic slowdown. The September terrorist
attacks further heightened economic uncertainty.
On average, foreign economic activity was about ﬂat
over the year. The weakest performer among indus-
trial economies was Japan, where output declined.
The euro area eked out a slight increase in its real
GDP. Activity in most emerging market economies in
both Asia and Latin America declined. Asian devel-
oping economies were particularly hard hit by the
falloff in demand for their high-tech exports. In Latin
America, the output decline in Mexico largely
reﬂected sharply reduced export demand from the
United States; Argentina’s ﬁnancial crisis precipi-
tated a further sharp drop in output in that country.
An easing of average foreign inﬂation reﬂected the
weakness of activity as well as a net decline in global
oil prices over the course of the year.
In response to the pronounced weakness in eco-
nomic activity, monetary authorities in the major
industrial countries eased policy throughout the year.
Nevertheless, interest rates on long-term government
securities showed little net change from the begin-
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Note. The data are quarterly. The velocity of M2 is the ratio of nominal
gross domestic product to the stock of M2. The opportunity cost of holding M2
is a two-quarter moving average of the difference between the three-month
Treasury bill rate and the weighted average return on a ssets included in M2.
168 Federal Reserve Bulletin March 2002countries. Weak economic conditions tended to put
downward pressure on long-term rates, but moves
toward more stimulative macroeconomic policies
appeared to encourage market participants to expect
economic recovery, thereby supporting long-term
interest rates. Following the terrorist attacks in Sep-
tember, interest rates declined around the globe as
expected economic activity weakened and demand
shifted away from equities and toward the relative
safety of bonds. However, toward year-end, as the
period of crisis passed, long-term interest rates
rebounded strongly.
Overall stock indexes in foreign industrial econo-
mies declined for the second consecutive year as
activity faltered and actual and projected corporate
earnings fell sharply. Technology-oriented stock
indexes again fell more than the overall indexes.
Among emerging market economies, the performance
of stocks was mixed; stock indexes in several Asian
emerging market economies rebounded strongly late
in the year, a move possibly reﬂecting market partici-
pants’ hopes for a revival in global demand for the
high technology products that feature prominently in
these countries’ exports. Argentine ﬁnancial markets
came under increasing pressure throughout the year
because of growing fears of a debt default and the
end of the peso’s peg to the dollar. Near year-end,
Argentine authorities in fact suspended debt pay-
ments to the private sector and, early in 2002, ended
the one-to-one peg to the dollar. There was limited
negative spillover to other emerging ﬁnancial mar-
kets from the sharp deterioration in Argentina’s eco-
nomic and ﬁnancial condition, in contrast to the
situation that prevailed during other emerging market
ﬁnancial crises of recent years.
The dollar’s average foreign exchange value
remained strong through most of 2001. The dollar
continued to rise despite mounting evidence of weak-
ening U.S. economic activity and the signiﬁcant eas-
ing of monetary policy by the FOMC. Market partici-
pants may have felt that the falloff in economic
growth in foreign economies and expectations that
the United States offered stronger prospects for eco-
nomic growth in the future outweighed disappoint-
ing U.S. economic performance in the near term.
The dollar’s average foreign exchange value against
the currencies of other major industrial countries
recorded a net increase of 8 percent over 2001 as a
whole. The dollar also strengthened, but by a lesser
amount, against the currencies of our most important
developing country trading partners. So far this year,
the dollar’s average value has risen further on
balance.
Industrial Economies
The dollar showed particular strength against the
Japanese yen last year, appreciating nearly 15 per-
cent. The weakness of the yen reﬂected serious ongo-
ing structural problems and the relapse of the Japa-
nese economy back into recession. Early in the year,
in response to signs of renewed weakening of the
economy, the Bank of Japan announced that it was
easing policy by shifting its operating target from the
overnight rate—already not far above zero—to bal-
ances held by ﬁnancial institutions at the Bank of
Japan. Policy was eased further and more liquidity
was injected into the banking system when the bal-
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Note. The data are monthly. Indexes are trade-weighted averages of the
exchange value of the dollar against major currencies and against the currencies
of a broader group of important U.S. trading partners. Last observations are the
average of trading days through February 21, 2002.
Monetary Policy Report to the Congress 169The yen received a temporary boost when Junichiro
Koizumi, widely seen as more likely to introduce
economic reforms, became prime minister in April.
The yen again strengthened in the immediate wake of
the September terrorist attacks, prompting the Bank
of Japan to make substantial intervention sales of
yen. However, later in the year, amid signs of a
renewed deterioration of economic conditions, the
yen again started to weaken signiﬁcantly.
For the year as a whole, Japanese real GDP is
estimated to have declined more than 1 percent, a
reversal of the rebound recorded the previous year.
Private investment declined and private consumption
moved lower, as households curtailed spending in the
face of rising unemployment and falling real income.
The winding-down of the large-scale public works
programs of recent years more than offset the effect
on growth from the additional spending contained in
several supplemental budgets. Last year marked the
third consecutive year of deﬂation, with the prices of
both consumer goods and real estate continuing to
move lower.
The dollar’s movements against the euro in 2001
appear to have been mainly inﬂuenced by market
perceptions of the strength of economic activity in
the United States relative to that in the euro area. In
the early part of the year, the euro weakened as
evidence mounted that the economic slowdown that
was already apparent in the United States as the year
began was also taking hold in Europe. During the
summer, the euro rose against the dollar as market
participants appeared to revise downward their
expectation of an early U.S. recovery. Then, later in
the year, with more signs of a further weakening of
activity in Europe, the euro again declined. On bal-
ance, the dollar appreciated more than 5 percent
relative to the euro over the course of the year. Real
GDP in the euro area is estimated to have increased
at less than a 1 percent rate in 2001, a sharp slowing
from the nearly 3 percent growth rate of the previous
year. Fixed investment and inventory investment both
are estimated to have made negative contributions to
the growth of real GDP, whereas consumption growth
remained near the rate of the previous year. The
slowing of growth in the euro area was not uniform
across countries, with weakness being more pro-
nounced in Germany and less so in France.
The European Central Bank (ECB) held off easing
monetary policy in the early months of the year,
restrained by the euro’s weakness, growth of M3 that
remained in excess of the ECB’s reference value, and
a euro-area inﬂation rate above its 2 percent target
ceiling. In May, evidence of slowing activity
prompted the ECB to reduce its key policy rate
25 basis points. Three additional reductions followed
later in the year, as activity weakened further and the
inﬂation rate receded toward its target ceiling. The
total reduction in the ECB’s key policy rate over the
course of the year was 150 basis points. The begin-
ning of 2002 saw the introduction of euro notes and
coins, a process that proceeded smoothly.
The dollar appreciated 6 percent against the Cana-
dian dollar in 2001 as the Canadian economy slowed
abruptly. Real GDP in Canada is estimated to have
been about ﬂat last year after growing more than
3 percent in 2000. A key factor in this slowing was
the sharp drop-off in Canadian exports to the United
States. An inventory correction also depressed out-
put. Earlier in the year, consumption was buoyed by
continued employment growth, tax cuts, and a hous-
ing boom. However, later in the year, growth of
consumption faltered as employment prospects wors-
ened and asset prices weakened. The Bank of Canada
has moved aggressively to counter the slowing of
economic activity by lowering its key policy interest
rate nine times in 2001 and once in January 2002 for
a cumulative total of 375 basis points.3 When the
Bank of Canada initiated easing moves early in 2001,
inﬂation was slightly above the Bank’s target range
of 1 percent to 3 percent; but by the end of the year,
slack activity and falling energy prices had pushed
the inﬂation rate down to near the bottom of the
range.
3. Among these reductions was one on September 17, when the
Bank of Canada (along with the ECB) announced a reduction of its
policy rate by 50 basis points, following the 50 basis point reduction
in the federal funds rate announced by the FOMC earlier in the day.
U.S. dollar exchange rate against the euro
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Argentina was a main focus of attention among
emerging market economies in 2001. In the ﬁrst part
of the year, worse-than-expected data on the ﬁscal
situation and concerns that the government would be
unable to implement announced ﬁscal measures
heightened doubts about whether Argentina would be
able to avoid a default on its debt. Argentine ﬁnancial
markets received only temporary support from a
large-scale debt exchange completed in June and an
enhancement of IMF support approved in September.
With ﬁnancial market conﬁdence eroding, conditions
took a dramatic turn for the worse late in the year;
ﬁnancial asset prices fell sharply, and funds moved
out of the banking system as the government moved
to restructure its debt and the one-to-one peg to the
dollar looked increasingly precarious. In early
December, the government imposed capital controls,
including limits on bank account withdrawals. These
restrictions led to widespread protests, which trig-
gered the resignation of President de la Rua and an
interval of political turmoil. After the resignation of
President de la Rua, the government announced it
would suspend debt payments to the private sector.
The government of the new president, Eduardo
Duhalde, suspended Argentina’s currency board
arrangement and established a temporary dual
exchange rate system. In early February, the dual
exchange rate system was abandoned, and the peso’s
ﬂoating rate moved to about 2 pesos per dollar amid
continuing economic uncertainty. For 2001 as a
whole, Argentine real GDP is estimated to have
fallen at well over a 5 percent rate, and prices
declined further.
To date, the negative spillover from events in
Argentina to other emerging ﬁnancial markets has
been limited, possibly because market participants
had been well aware of Argentina’s problems for
some time and viewed them as largely conﬁned to
that country. Brazil was probably most heavily
affected by events in Argentina, and the bond spread
on Brazilian debt showed a net increase of about
110 basis points over the course of last year while the
spread on Argentina debt exploded upward. Other
important factors weighing on Brazilian economic
activity last year likely were weak growth in the
United States—Brazil’s most important export
market—and the emergence of an energy shortage as
drought limited hydroelectric output. For the year as
a whole, Brazilian real GDP is estimated to have
risen at less than a 1 percent rate after growing at a
4 percent rate the previous two years. The Brazilian
currency registered a net depreciation against the
dollar of about 16 percent over the course of last year,
while stock prices declined more than 10 percent.
The Brazilian central bank tightened policy last year
in an effort to hold down the inﬂationary impact of
currency depreciation.
Real GDP in Mexico declined about 1 percent in
2001, a sharp reversal from the 5 percent growth
rates recorded in the previous two years. The falloff
in activity was mainly a reﬂection of the negative
effects on direct trade and conﬁdence in Mexico
arising from the slowdown of the U.S. economy. In
light of the marked weakening of activity, declining
inﬂation, and a strong peso, the Bank of Mexico
started to loosen the stance of monetary policy in
May, and short-term interest rates continued to
decline over the rest of the year. In February 2002,
the Bank of Mexico moved to tighten monetary con-
ditions, citing concerns that an increase in adminis-
tered prices would raise inﬂation. Mexican ﬁnancial






















Note. The data are monthly. Exchange rates are in foreign currency units per
dollar. As of January 2002, the Argentine peso rate is the ﬂoating rate. Bond
spreads are the J.P. Morgan Emerging Market Bond Index (stripped Brady-
bond) spreads over U.S. Treasuries; the dotted line is a break in the series for
Argentina in December 2001. Last observations are the average of trading days
through February 21, 2002.
Monetary Policy Report to the Congress 171appreciating 5 percent against the dollar and stock
prices rising nearly 15 percent. The effect on Mexi-
can ﬁnancial markets from Argentina’s difﬁculties
appeared to have been quite limited, as indicated by
the net decline of the Mexican debt spread by
80 basis points over the course of the year.
Economic growth in the Asian emerging market
economies turned negative last year. On average, real
GDP in developing Asia is estimated to have declined
about 1 percent in 2001, compared with average
growth of 6 percent in the previous year. A key factor
in this slowing was the sharp falloff in global demand
for the high-tech products that had fueled rapid export
growth in the region in recent years.
The economies of Taiwan, Singapore, and Malay-
sia are highly dependent on exports of semiconduc-
tors and other high-tech products, and as global
demand for these goods was cut back sharply, real
GDP in these countries declined by an estimated
5 percent on average last year. Indonesia and Thai-
land, both relatively less dependent on high-tech
exports and experiencing some reduction in political
tension over the course of the year, managed to
record small positive real GDP growth rates last year,
albeit well below rates of the previous year.
Korean real GDP is estimated to have increased
about 2 percent in 2001. While in an absolute sense
Korea is an important exporter of high-tech products
such as semiconductors, it has a relatively more
diversiﬁed economy than most of its Asian neigh-
bors, and thus the magnitude of its slowdown last
year was somewhat muted. Government moves
toward monetary and ﬁscal policy stimulus over the
course of the year helped support domestic demand
in Korea.
In China, recorded growth of real GDP remained
robust last year. China’s lesser dependency on exports
in general, and high-tech exports in particular, cush-
ioned it from last year’s global slowdown, and the
government stepped up the pace of ﬁscal stimulus to
offset weakening private demand. Hong Kong, with
exports not heavily concentrated in high-tech goods
and an economy closely integrated with a rapidly
growing Chinese economy, is nevertheless estimated
to have experienced a decline in real GDP last year.
The peg of Hong Kong’s currency to a strengthening
U.S. dollar put pressure on its competitive position,
and domestic price deﬂation continued.
Conditions in ﬁnancial markets in emerging Asia
were, for the most part, not particularly volatile last
year. Debt spreads were little changed on average for
the region as a whole, exchange rates against the
dollar generally moved lower, and stock indexes
declined somewhat on average.
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